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A management analysis of the Naval Telecommunications Center,
Monterey, was conducted to analyze the requirements placed on this
center, as well as to determine how capable it was to perform these
requirements. A computer simulation model was developed and used
to quantify the message processing capabilities of the center under
various historical conditions. Results showed that the various
requirements placed on this center have been constantly increasing,
without regard to the center's ability to handle them. The results
also showed that at times the center's capabilities were limited by
its machine capabilities, while at other times they were limited by
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I. OBJECTIVE
The objective of this thesis is to make a management analysis of
the U. S. Naval Telecommunications Center, Monterey, California. This
thesis examines what requirements have been placed on the telecommunications
center, how well it has been fulfilling its requirements, and how those
requirements have been changed in the recent past.
To accomplish this goal, a study was performed to analyze the
external environment within which the telecommunications center operates.
This study explains why the telecommunications center exists, as well as
what its role is as an integral part of the total Naval Communications
Systems.
The internal environment was analyzed as well. The internal con-
straints and capabilities were examined to determine how well this
telecommunications center responded to its changing external environment.
A computer simulation model of the telecommunications center was developed
to quantify its capabilities and define its limitations. This simulation
technique is readily modified to adapt to the changing external and
internal requirements and capabilities of the center.
As a result of examining these two facets of the Naval Telecommunica-
tions Center, Monterey, greater understanding is gained of some everyday
problems and mistakes found in a communications system. This thesis will
also show the value of simulation as a technique for analyzing a
communications system.

II. BACKGROUND AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
A. THE MAN-MACHINE INTERFACE
The major problem in the U. S. Naval Telecommunications System is the
man-machine interface. This is the part of the total communications
system in which manual handling of message traffic (in this case, in the
form of punched paper tapes and hard copy messages) is necessary for the
interface between one piece of mechanical equipment and another to be
accomplished. Machine capabilities are subject to numerous variations,
most of which have been the subject of a considerable amount of research
resulting in a high degree of accuracy in performance measurement. Per-
formance measurement of human capabilities is an art rather than a science.
Although much expense and effort has been expended in this field, there
is no generally accepted criteria for predicting human performance
.
Therefore, in any field of endeavor where man and machine must work in
harmony to accomplish a specific task, much is known about the performance
of the machine, but the performance of the man is largely an unknown ar-i
unpredictable quantity.
The U. S. Navy has, for the most part, mastered the technical pro-
blems in the automated machine portion of the Naval Telecommunications
System; but when the message gets into the hands of the nan, the objectives
of Naval Communications--reliability, accuracy, speed, and security
—
are jeopardized. The Navy is acutely aware of this problem and there are,
at present, plans to automate message handling at many communications
stations, both ashore and afloat, within the next ten years.
B. THE NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS AUTOMATION PROGRAM
The Naval Communications Automation Program is designed to achieve
the objectives of Naval Communication by means of the application of
8

state of the art automatic data processing technology and procedures.
The approach taken is to gradually automate all key nodal points of the
Naval Communications System. This system uses optical character readers,
high-speed reproduction and sorting devices, video display terminals,
as well as direct-access computer interfaces, all under the control of a
central processing unit.
1. Objectives
The objectives of automating these key nodal points ares
a. Increased Speed
To reduce the average time required to process incoming and
outgoing messages. In order to meet the Joint Chiefs of Staff required
*
writer-to-reader handling times, the automated system will process Flash
precedence messages in less than two minutes, Operational Immediate in
under five minutes, Priority in an average of thirty minutes, and Routine
in an average of one hour. "This objective can only be met with complete
automation. ,(1
b. Increased Accuracy
To reduce the error rates to less than one per cent of the
message traffic handled.
c. Increased Security
To reduce security violations to near zero.
d. Increased Reliability
To reduce mis -routed messages and non-delivered messages
to less than one in ten million.




2 • Automation Ashore
At present, there are fourteen of the automated communications
stations proposed, of which two are operational. A test bed site is
operational at the Washington Navy Yard, and a second unit is operational
at the Chief of Naval Operations' Communications Center ( OPNAV TCC).
Three others are in various stages of completion. The system called the
Local Digital Message System and the Naval Communications Processing and
Routing System (LDMX/NAVCOMPARS) located at OPNAV TCC has cost about five
million dollars to date, with an annual operating cost of about two and
one-half million dollars. Over its proposed life of eight years, it is
anticipated that the elimination of manpower and material as a result of
this automated installation will save the Navy approximately two million
dollars. Similar figures are available for the other LBMX/NAVCOMPARS
sites.
3. Automation Afloat
In addition to these shore automated communications centers, thara
has been some progress in automating communication centers afloat. The
automated Message Processing and Distribution System (MPDS) is currently
installed and operating aboard the USS OKLAHOMA CITY. It is also being
installed aboard the two new CVAN's currently under construction, the
USS EISENHOWER and the USS NIMITZ. Because the MPDS has not bean proven
to be cost-effective, the Chief of Naval Operations' Industrial Advisory
Committee on Telecommunications (CIACT) has recommended that this program
be held in abeyance. *-
These expensive, central-processor controlled systems will never
be cost-effective for a small telecommunications center.
"CIACT Action Group, Communications Automation, p. 6-6, 1972.
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Until some time in the future when inexpensive computers are in use,
some other methods must be developed to upgrade the capabilities of the
man in the man-machine interface. The function of the man is message
handling and this takes time. This thesis examines the effects of this
message handling time on the capabilities of the Naval Telecommunications
Center, Monterey.
C. MISSIONS OF INVOLVED ACTIVITIES
The primary mission of the Naval Telecommunications Center, Monterey,
is to provide communications support for all Naval activities in the
Monterey area. These activities include the U. S. Naval Postgraduate
School, the Defense Management Systems Center, which is closely allied
with the Naval Postgraduate School, and the Fleet Numerical Weather
Central. The missions of the Naval Postgraduate School and the Defense
Management Systems Center are primarily to educate military officers and
civilian employees. The mission of the Fleet Numerical Weather Central
is, "to provide, on an operational basis, numerical meteorological pro-
ducts and oceanographic products peculiar to the needs of the Departme c of
tic Navy; and to develop and test numerical techniques in meteorology a 1
oceanography applicable to NAVWEASERVCOM analytical and forecasting
problems."-^ To accomplish this mission, enormous amounts of data must
be received, analysed, and sent to and from numerous activities.
By far, the heaviest burden (in traffic volume) placed on the Naval
Telecommunications Center, Monterey, is message support for the Fleet
Numerical Weather Central. When one considers the messaga volume handled
by the telecommunications center, it, in effect, acts as a subunit of the
Fleet Numerical Weather Central.
'Fleet Numerical Weather Central, Monterey, California, Background
Information Folder, p. 6.
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It handles thosa messages which cannot, for reasons which shall be
delineated later, be sent through Fleet Numerical Weather Central's
numerous other communications channels. In fact, five of the seventeen
missions and functions of the Fleet Numerical Weather Central, as found
in their Background Information Folder, deal with data communications.
Some of the networks presently in use include a multi-drop system,
several point-to-point systems, and a switched network. Modes of operation
feature computer-to-computer links, computer-to-teletype links and various
types of hand -carried operations.
D. FLEET NUMERICAL WEATHER CENTRAL'S COMMUNICATIONS
1. Input
In discussion of Fleet Numerical Weather Central's communications,
its overall role must be discussed. To accomplish its mission (as pre-
viously stated) it must receive and analyze data. This data consists
primarily of synoptic meteorological observations taken and reported in
accordance with the procedure of tha World Meteorological Organization,
and oceanographic observations obtained from U. S. Navy ships and aircraft,
as well as merchant ships, fishing boats, and oceanographic research
vessels.
The primary source of meteorological data for Fleet Numerical
Weather Central is the worldwide network of observation stations coor-
dinated by the World Meteorological Organization. This collection system
is known as the World Weather Watch. Reported data from the World
Weather Watch reaches Fleet Numerical Weather Central through various
routes.
a. The Automated Weather Network
The route through which tha majority of meteorological data
12

is received is the U. S« Air Force Automated Weather Network. This
is because the U. S. Mr Force has been tasked to run the weather
collection system for the Department of Defense. The Automated Weather
Network collects weather data from all over the world and relays it
through high-speed lines to the Automated Digital Weather Switch, the
collection point for the entire network, located at Carswell Air Force
Base, Texas. The Global Weather Center at Oxfutt Air Force Base in
Nebraska is the control center for Air Force users of this data,
b. The Naval Environmental Data Network
Fleet Numerical Weather Central, Monterey, is the master
station of the Navy user network, known as the Naval Environmental Data
Network. Data required by the Naval Environmental Data Network is re-
layed from Carswell Air Force Base to Fleet Numerical Weather Central.
All the Naval Environmental Data Network lines are leased commerical lines
which are contracted and budgeted for by the Commander, Naval Communications
Command, but managed by the Commander, Naval Weather Service Command.
Weather observations taken by U. S. Navy ships in accordance
with NAVWEASERVCOMNST 31ii0.1A and NWP-lo are transmitted to prescribed
regional Fleet Weather Centers for entry into the Naval Environmental
Data Network. These same observations are also sent from the ships
directly to Fleet Numerical Weather Central. Data obtained from
meteorological satellites is collected by the Naval Environmental Satellite
Center and is entered into the Naval Environmental Data Network by the
Fleet Weather Facility, Suitland, Maryland.
For oceanographic data, the Naval Weather Service relies on
all possible sources of data. Reports from U. S. Navy ships are taken
in accordance with OCEANAVINST 316O.I4 and 3160.9. These reports were
13

once sent directly from the ships to the prescribed regional Fleet
Weather Center, and from there over the Naval Environmental Data Network
to Fleet Numerical Weather Central. Th6se messages are now sent directly
from the ships to Fleet Numerical Weather Central. In addition, overseas
Fleet Weather Centers collect oceanographic data from all available
foreign sources and transmit this data to Fleet Numerical Weather Central.
Many oceanographic reports are collected from fishing vessels by the
Bureau of Commerical Fisheries Activity, La Jolla, California, and are
then transmitted to Fleet Numerical Weather Central via the West Coast
Tie Line.
2. Output
Once this data is received, it is processed and analyzed. The
output consists of meteorological and oceanographic observed data, analyses
and prognoses to all Naval Weather Service and other activities on the
Naval Environmental Data Network, to fleet users via the Naval Environ-
mental Data Network and Naval Communications Command facilities, and to
Air Force users via the Automated Weather Network.
E. FLEET NUMERICAL WEATHER CENTRAL'S CIRCUITS
In order to fully understand the role of the Naval Teiecommunica Lens
Center, Monterey, the communications circuits supporting Fleet Numerical
Weather Central must be examined. (Refer to figures 1-3)
1. Automated Weather Network Circuits
As previously mentioned, the primary data source for Fleet
Numerical Weather Central is the Air Force Automated Weather Network.
Fleet Numerical Waather Central has two primary circuits and their back-
ups connecting it to the Automated Weather Network. The first circuit
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a leased voice-grade line with C2 conditioning with either the CDC 160A
or CDC 8090 computer at Fleet Numerical Weather Central. Operation of
this circuit is full duplex at 1|800 BAUD, synchronous transmission. The
alternate line is a microwave system leased from the telephone company.
It is also a full duplex 14800 BAUD line. The primary traffic on this
circuit is raw data. This circuit is not crypto -protected.
The second interface with the Automated Weather Network is
a circuit connecting Fleet Numerical Weather Central with the Global
Weather Center at Offutt Air Force Base. Communications facilities to
and from Offutt are the same as those to Carswell. The only difference
is that the alternate line from Offutt to Monterey is via the Automated
Weather Network to Carswell, and thence via the primary circuit to Fleet
Numerical Weather Central. This circuit is also not crypto -protected.
The circuit from Carswell to Monterey inputs an average of
63O bits per second of raw data into Fleet Numerical Weather Central.
This path carries approximately £0 million bits of information during
an average operational day. The circuit to the Global Weather Center
is presently used for about one hour per day (1$ minutes-four tioies
per day). This traffic consists of mutual exchanges of evaluated
meteorological data.
2. Naval Enviroamental Data Network Circuits
a. High-Speed Circuits
The secondary data route for Fleet Namerical Weather Central
is via the Naval Environmental Data Network. This network consists of
high-speed leased lines connecting the various Fleet Weather Centers and
Fleet Numerical Weather Central. There are two mainline circuits in this
network which interface with Fleet Numerical Weather Central: one to
Fleet Weather Center, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, and the other to Fleet
18

Weather Center, Norfolk, Virginia. Transmission to these two Fleet
Weather Centers is accomplished by identical equipment. Each Fleet
Weather Center has three computers to handle and route data: a CDC
3100, a CDC 8k90, and a CDC 160. The primary lines are leased voice-
grade lines with C2 conditioning operating full duplex, 2I4.OO BAUD,
with serial transmission. Information is forwarded from Fleet Weather
Center, Pearl Harbor, to Fleet Weather Center, Guam, and from there to
all Western Pacific users. Information is also forwarded from Fleet
Weather Center, Norfolk, to Fleet Weather Center, Rota, Spain, and to
Fleet Weather Facility, London, for all European users. Norfolk also
supplies finished products to a multi-drop network on the East Coast.
This network, known as the East Coast Tie Line, is similar to the one
on the West Coast which will be discussed later. The Naval Environmental
Data Network circuits are not crypto -protected. These two paths input
an average of $0 million bits of information during an average twenty-
two hour operational day.
There is a new J4.8OO BAUD, full duplex circuit installed
solely for the purpose of transmitting satellite data from Fleet Weather
Facility, Suitland, Maryland. This circuit is not fully operational
and is not crypto-protected.
b. West Coast Tie Line
The final Naval Environmental Data Network circuit which
connects to Fleet Numerical Weather Central is the West Coast Tie Line.
This line ties together a large number of users on the West Coast. Most
of these users simply collect and use the products supplied to them by
Fleet Numerical Weather Central. This line is a leased, voice-grade,
half duplex line with C2 conditioning operating at 2I4OO BAUD, using
synchronous transmission. Stations are connected to the line in a
19

multi-drop arrangement. The input to this line is from two magnetic
tape units which are fed from either of the two CDC 3200 computers. At
each receiving station, there are two CAL-COMP plotters capable of re-
ceiving digital weather maps as well as a teletype. This circuit is
also not crypto -protected.
3 • Analysis of the Automated Weather Network and Naval Environmental
Data Network Circuits
If one had to characterize the communications circuits discussed
so far and used for the collection and dissemination of meteorological
and oceanographic information, the words "high volume", "high speed",
and "automation" immediately come to mind. Environmental observations
are collected from worldwide sources at Monterey. These observations,
both meteorological and oceanographic, are transmitted to the Fleet
Numerical Weather Central where they are quality-checked, sorted, and
edited by automatic programs. Then analysis and prognostic programs
take over, and basic processed data are transmitted to the Fleet Weather
Centers, computer-to-computer, at the equivalent of U800 teletype word;
per minute. At the same time, data is being automatically sent and
received at the equivalent of 9600 words per minute, computer-to -compu ar,
with the Automated Weather Network. This same process takes place over
almost all the various communications links. Most of the analysis and
dissemination processes are completely automatic, utilizing modern computer
and ancillary equipment coupled with high-speed, highly efficient, three
continent, communications links.
These communications networks provide Fleet Numerical Weather
Central with the major portion of its data (approximately 120 million
data bits per day). This is an enormous amount of data and is most
20

important to Fleet Numerical Weather Central, but these networks suffer
from certain major disadvantages.
h- Disadvantages of These Circuits
a. All of these networks are uncovered. This lack of crypto-
protection means that all classified traffic, Encrypted for Transmission
Only (EFTO) and higher, transmitted to and from Fleet Numerical Weather
Central cannot be sent over any of these paths. The significance of this
disadvantage is fully realized when one understands that all record
traffic sent to and from all Navy ships has as its minimum classification,
unclassified (EFTO) . Record traffic is defined as all the communications
between one unit and another, conducted by means of a teletype. For
Navy ships, this is all communications, exclusive of those conducted by
means of a voice radio -telephone circuit.
b. With presently installed equipment, there is no way for
digital data to be sent between a ship and a shore station. The Naval
Environmental Data Network and the Automated Weather Network are digital
networks and connect the ground stations. At sea, there are some ships
equipped with the Naval Tactical Data System which can communicate with
each other in digital form using a data link (Link 11), but there is
no present means for interfacing these two digital networks . This prob-
lem is being looked at in relation to the utilization of the future
Naval Communications Satellite, but as yet there is no foreseeable
solution to this problem.
J? . Interface With the Naval Communications System
As a result of these problems, the final communications path
to be utilized by Fleet Numerical Weather Central comes into play. This
path interfaces Fleet Numerical Weather Central v/ith the Naval Communications
21

System. Until January 16, 1973 > this path consisted of a full duplex,
crypto-protected, 100 word per minute teletype link from Fleet Numerical
Weather Central to the Naval Telecommunications Center. This link is
called the "pony loop". The sending and receiving equipment at Fleet
Numerical Weather Central consists of magnetic tape units, punched paper
tape units, or teletypes with manual interfaces to the computers.
At the Naval Telecommunications Center, there is another manual
interface. It is this manual interface that receives the most attention
in this thesis. At this manual interface, messages, in the form of
punched paper tape, are transferred from one teletype to another. This .
is where a great deal of manual record-keeping takes place, and where the
man processes the message. At this interface, messages to and from Fleet
Numerical Weather Central are transferred between the 100 word per minute
teletype "pony loop" circuit and a Western Union (manufacturer) AUTODIN
Mode 5 terminal. This terminal is a 100 word per minute teletype con-
nected to a full duplex crypto-protected line terminating at the Defense
Communications System Automatic Switching Center, Norton, California.
These two circuits, with the rianual interface at the Naval Tele-
communications Station,- Monterey, connect the Fleet Numerical Weather
Central with the Defense Communications System and eventually with any
military unit and civilian user, or provider, of weather information.
The Defense Communications System is that system of high-speed (2I4.OO or
U800 BAUD), long haul, digital communications lines and switches which
interconnect all the land-based communications stations within the
Department of Defense throughout the world.
a. A Representative Example
For example, in order for Fleet Numerical Weather Central to
22

send a message of any type to a Navy ship somewhere off the coast of
northern California (i.e. off Monterey) it would transmit that message
over the "pony loop" to the Naval Telecommunications Center, Monterey,
at 100 words per minute. After certain record-keeping functions were
performed, that message would be re-broadcast over a 100 word per minute
circuit to the AUTODIN Automatic Switching Canter at Norton Air Force
Base in southern California. Using automatic message switching, the mes-
sage would then be switched over to Defense Communications System lines to
the AUTODIN Automatic Switching Center at McClellan Air Force Base in
northern California at 2l|00 BAUDo Using automatic - switching again, the
message would then be sent over Naval Communications Command lines at
2I4.OO BAUD to an AUTODIN Mode I terminal at Naval Communications Station,
San Francisco. Using an IBM 360/20 computer as a message processor,
this message would then be automatically switched internally to the
appropriate punched paper tape unit, where the paper tape would then
be torn off and manually entered on the outgoing circuit presently copied
by that ship. This would be a 100 word per minute high-frequency radio
link. This massage would ba in encrypted form at all times when it was
traveling over any of tha communications links, but would be in plain
text at any one of the nodes.
Until automated systems are Installed, something must be
done to upgrade the present system. Although the Naval Telecommunications
Canter, Monterey, is only a minor node in the entire system, many of the
lessons learned can ba applied to other communications centers.
b. Machine Capabilities
Returning to the contribution this telecommunications
center makes toward the accomplishment of Fleet Numerical Weather Central's
23

missions, an understanding must be gained of the relationship between
BAUD and words per minute. Using rounded figures, 100 words per
minute is approximately equal to 75 bits per second. However, if the
overhead is discounted, this rate is reduced.
By this, it is meant that the digital traffic sent over
AUTODIN or over any of the digital weather networks uses synchronous
transmission with control bits every 80 characters, while the teletype
uses a synchronous transmission with 3 of every 11 bits used for con-
trol. Because of this difference in the mode of transmission, the
teletype carries only about two-thirds the amount of information at any
rate of speed as a synchronous system. Therefore, 75 bits per second
is effectively 50 BAUD when comparing the two different transmission
modes.
At 100 vrords per minute, the maximum one-way through-
put of this teletype link is about four million bits per day. This is
a very small amount when one considers that on an average day, Fleet
Numerical Weather Central inputs approximately 120 million bits by
means of its other communications channels. This moans that this tele-
communications center,- working at its maximum capability, can supply
a little over three per cent of Fleet Numerical 's data.
' To say that the loss of this channel would represent
only a three per cent loss in communications capability would be un-
realistic. This channel fills a unique role in Fleet Numerical Weather
Central's overall communications. Over this path are carried all messages
to and from Navy ships, as well as the vast majority of Fleet Numerical's
operational and administrative message traffic. Any other traffic of
this sort is sent via the U. S. Mail or conducted over the telephone.
2k

F. THE NAVAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS CENTER, MONTEREY
How capable is this center? Are its capabilities measured only in
terms of the machines on the circuit, or are there other factors involved?
The simulation developed for this thesis will answer those questions.
First, the outgoing traffic will be examined. As shown in Appendix A,
this path is perfectly capable of handling Fleet Numerical Weather Central's
outgoing traffic. From July, 1971 s to July, 1972, outgoing traffic of all
kinds through Naval Telecommunications Center, Monterey, has varied between
1000 and 35>00 messages per month. Fleet Numerical Weather Central's traffic
accounts for well over 90 per cent of that volume.
It is the incoming message volume that presents the greatest problems.
In the recent past, all incoming traffic volume, with the exception of
those messages to Fleet Numerical Weather Central, has remained at a
fairly constant 2000 messages per month. Incoming traffic to Fleet
Numerical Weather Central has increased significantly sinco January, 1971.
For about two years until July, 1971, incoming messages to Fleet Numerical
Weather Central, routed through the Naval Telecommunications Center,
oscillated around a relatively constant 1;000 per month.
1. Acquisition of the OTSR Function
In August of 1971> Fleet Numerical Weather Central took over the
Optimum Track Slip Routing (OTSR) function from the regional Fleet Weather
Centers. This OTSR function is a very important service provided to
United States warships and merchant ships. The ships file an advance copy
of their expected movements across the oceans, as well as any deviations
in their movements from the original track.
25

Fleet Numerical Weather Central then advises the ships in advance which
ocean routes to take to get the best weathar and calmest seas. Any changes
to the original recommendation are also sent to the ships when en route.
When the need arises, storm warnings are also sent to these ships, as well
as to all United States ships in a storm's path.
Before assigning this function to Fleet Numerical Weather Central,
quite an extensive study was conducted by the Commander, Naval Weather
Service Command, beginning in April of 1971> concerning the feasibility
of this change. All concerned parties were consulted and a great deal of
advance preparations were made. Of particular attention in this study was
the ability of Naval Telecommunications Center, Monterey, to handle the
increased message load. At the time, the Commanding Officer of the Naval
Postgraduate School, then in charge of the telecommunications center,
seemed to be concerned with some sort of fairness doctrine. He reported
that the increased massage load would increase Fleet Numerical' s share of
the traffic volume from some 66 percent to about 80 per cent without any
man-polder support from Fleet Numerical Weather Central. There seemed t
be no real concern over actual message volume prior to the acquisition i
the OTSR function.
As a result of this study, there wars no changes whatsoever made
in the manpower, material, or procedures at the telecommunications center
prior to 1 August 1971. When the messages began arriving on that day at
twice the rate of the previous day, as a result of the OTSR acquisition,
everyone at the telecommunications center was taken by surprise. No one
had predicted a doubling of the volume. The internal handling procedures
coupled with the message volume caused a change from a four-section watch




On the sixth of August, a request for more men went out in order
to resume the four-section watch. After a very traumatic month, man-
power was increased by three, some outside collateral duties of the
radiomen were eliminated (such as changing combinations at the student
mail center and burning all the Postgraduate School's classified
material), and some internal procedures were changed slightly. There
was an elimination of non-OPNAV INST 5500. I4OB required stamps on messages,
and an elimination of the radiomen hand-carrying all messages to the
action officer for his signature. Instead, customers came to the
telecommunications center and picked up their messages; a signature
was required for secret messages only.
As a result of these changes, the telecommunications center
found that it could just barely handle the traffic load. There were
peak periods during the day when very large queues were formed, and
slack periods when the queues could be reduced; but, in general, the
operation was still marginal.
2 . Change in Control
The Naval Telecommunications Center operated for about eight
months under an incoming traffic load which oscillated around a mean
of 8000 messages per month. During the entire period, it was realized
that the operation was marginal. As a result of numerous requests for
help, on June 1, 1972, the telecommunications center was taken away
from the operational control of the Naval Postgraduate school and
consolidated under the command of the Commanding Officer, U. S. Naval
Telecommunications Station, San Francisco. This change was made so
there would be better-informed personnel representing the interests
of the telecommunications center, and so that fluctuations in personnel
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could be rapidly taken care of by assigning Temporary Additional Duty
(TAD) personnel from San Francisco. Repairs could then be made much
more rapidly by sending qualified repairmen down from San Francisco.
Prior to this time, the telecommunications center had to borrow semi-
qualified repairmen, as the need arose, from the Electrical Engineering
Department of the Naval Postgraduate School. This change eased the
burden of responsibility at the Naval Telecommunications Center, Monterey,
3 • Change in Reporting Procedures
In July, 1972, the situation became worse. As a result of a
dialogue among Fleet Numerical Weather Central; Commander, Naval Weather
Service Command; and Commander, Naval Communications Command, a relatively
minor (or so it seemed) change was made in the reporting procedures
for ships reporting their oceanographic and meteorological observations.
Fleet Numerical Weather Central was displeased with the time delays
found in the system of reporting procedures for ships' bathythermograph
reports (oceanographic) and weather reports (meteorological).
Under the old procedure, all U. S. Naval ships at sea were
required to send their bathythermographic reports (four per day) and
weather reports (two' per day) to the nearest Fleet Weather Center. At
the Fleet Weather Center, the data would be held long enough for internal
usage. Messages would then be sent over the Naval Environmental Data
Network to Fleet Numerical Weather Central with the ship's name deleted
from the message. The transmission over the Naval Environmental Data
Network was unencrypted while the transmission to the Fleet Weather
Centers from the ships would be encrypted. There was generally a four-
hour delay between the transmission by the ship and the reception by
Fleet Numerical Weather Central, caused by hold-ups at the regional
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Fleet Weather Centers. The Naval Telecommunications Center, Monterey,
was not included, nor its capabilities considered in making the change.
This "minor" change consisted of telling all ships to send
their reports directly to Fleet Numerical Weather Central and in
addition, to send an information copy to the regional Fleet Weather
Centers. For a few months, these messages were sent over the Naval
Environmental Data Network to Fleet Numerical Weather Central, as
previously described, but this practice has been discontinued.
The increase in traffic volume resulted in what has been de-
scribed by the center personnel as "utter chaos". In July, approximately
20,000 messages were sent through the telecommunications center to
Fleet Numerical Weather Central. This was approximately two and one-
half times the traffic volume just barely handled in June. In October,
the busiest month to date, over 2)4, 000 messages to Fleet Numerical
Weather Central were processed.
To their credit, the assigned personnel at the telecommunications
center adopted a "can do" attitude and coped with these problems. The
formal message handling procedures which had been adopted when the
center's entire message load, both incoming and outgoing, was less tha
6,000 messages per month, were informally ignored. The only criterion
was to get the traffic out. As the simulation will show, the formal
procedures were so time -consuming that they could not have allowed the
passage of the amount of message traffic that passed through this
telecommunications center.
k' The I. G. Inspection
a. Informal Recommendations
In September, 1972, the Naval Telecommunications Center,
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Monterey, underwent an inspection by the Inspector General of the
Navy (I. G.). As a result, the informal message handling procedures
were formalized, and thus a great reduction in the time and effort
required to process each message was realized. The I. G. team made
informal recommendations concerning the administrative records which
were kept for each message. It recommended that most of the records
be eliminated since:
(1) there was no time to maintain them;
(2) they were not being maintained properly;
(3) they were not required by COMNAVCOl'M
.
In fact, most of these records were maintained because that
was the way it had always been done. These recommendations met with
enthusiasm on the part of all hands and were immediately, implemented.
b. Formal Recommendations
The I. G. inspectors made soma formal recommendations
concerning equipment changes. Beginning with the new traffic load in
July, 1972, the 100 word per minute teletype links began to become
saturated with incoming traffic for Fleet Numerical Weather Central.
Starting in July, the Mods 5 link between the Telecommunications Center
and its Defense Communications System interface at Norton Air Force
Ease became the busiest of any at Norton.
At 100 words per minute ($0 BAUD effective) there is a
maximum amount of traffic that can be sent during any particular period.
That maximum was reached numerous times. This maximum was measured on
numerous occasions as 8000 line groups per day (an AUTODIN term).
Each line group consists of 80 characters plus two start
and two stop characters. Long-term data on message lengths at the
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telecommuni cations center shows that the average message consists of
ten line groups. This means that the maximum machine capability over
any twenty-four hour period is 800 average sized messages or 33 1/3
messages per hour. If at any time this rate is approached, a queue is
formed at the AUTODIN Switch at Norton. Beginning in July, 1972, it was
not uncommon for queues of 5>0 or more messages to be formed several
times per day. In fact, in October, 1972, it was not at all uncommon
to have over 800 messages per day sent to Fleet Numerical Weather
Central alone.
In order to get this volume of traffic through to Fleet
Numerical, an alternate route was established. Whenever a queue of $0
or more messages developed at Norton, these messages would be "alt-
routed" to McClellan, and then to Fort Ord. The duty officer at Fort
Ord would then call the Naval Telecommunications Center, Monterey, to
inform them that incoming traffic was being received for them. A radio-
man would then drive to the communications center at Fort Ord, pick up
the hard copies of the messages and the punched paper tapes, and drive
to Fleet Numerical Weather Central. The radioman would then show the
watch officer the messages and - get an indication from him of how time-
sensitive the information was. The radioman would drive back to the
telecommunications center and send the time -sensitive traffic immediately
over the "pony loop". The other traffic would be sent whenever there
was capacity available on the "pony loop". This method of communications
obviously needed changing.
By the time of the I. G. inspection, the Naval Telecommuni-
cat: ;s Center had been requesting, to no avail, an upgrading of its
capabilities. The formal report of the I. G. added credence to their
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requests by recommending an immediate upgrading of the system. In
October, 1972, Commanding Officer, Maval Communications Station, San
Francisco, (the Naval Telecommunications Center's next senior in the
chain of command) made a formal request to Commander, Naval Communications
Command for the following:
(1) Immediate allocation for and installation of an
additional 100 word per minute Mode f? terminal.
(2) Immediate allocation for and installation of another
"pony loop" to Fleet Numerical Weather Central. This was to be a
simplex circuit for one-way only transmission.
(3) Installation of a 2l*00 BAUD, Mode I AUTODIN terminal,
to include a magnetic tape unit at Fleet Numerical Weather Central
immediately adjacent to the computer facility. This was seen as the
optimum solution, to the problem even though it was realized that there
is currently no space available to put one in.
These recommendations were adopted with the following
results
:
(1) When the new Fleet Numerical Weather Central computer
facility is constructed (sometime in FT 1976), it is currently plannec
to have a Mode I installed immediately adjacent to the computers.
(2) The new simplex "pony loop" was installed in late
December, 1972.
(3) The new Mode f> was installed in early January, 1973?




The approach utilized to conduct this analysis was to develop a
computer simulation model of the Naval Telecommunications Center,
Monterey. Numerous interviews with the personnel stationed there, as
well as many visits to the center, provided data, concerning how the
telecommunications center functioned. This data, coupled with the
monthly traffic summaries (enclosed in Appendix A) was used to simulate
the message handling function of the facility.
The mechanical capacities of the various machines and transmissions
systems in and out of the telecommunications center were known. Equip-
ment utliaation could be found by dividing actual message processing
rate by equipment processing rate. Personnel limitations were unknown.
If one asked a radioman how busy ha was during this time, the answer
would be, "very busy". It is the purpose of this thesis to quantify
what "very busy" meant.
A casual observation of the operations at the telecommunications
center indicates that message processing takes too much time. The term
message processing, in general, means everything done to a message. It
was the author's opinion at the commencement of this effort that it was
the time involved in processing each message through the facility, rather
than the machine capability, that limited the through-put of the system.
A. WHY SIMULATION?
Simulation is a technique that provides an affective means to test,
evaluate, and manipulate a system or facility without any actual direct
interference with it. Days or months of system operation can be sim-
ulated in a matter of minutes or hours using a computer. It must be
remembered that simulation is but a symbolic representation, often an
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abstract representation--not a precise analog. It can, however, provide
comparisons between systems which would not be possible to achieve in
any other way.
There are several simulation languages available today, of which
IBM's Ganaral Purpose System Simulator (GPSS) is one example. As the
name implies, this is a general purpose simulation language that permits
a system to be described and modelled. This is a highly flexible
language that can be applied to the simulation of many systems. Tha
GPSS is also characterized by its provisions for making adjustments to
basic program logic.
B. FUNCTIONS OF THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS CENTER
The Telecommunications Canter provides four distinct services as
follows
:
(1) The reception, processing, and ra -transmission of messages
to Fleet Numerical Weather Central. (FNWC INCOMING)
(2) The reception, processing, and re -transmission of messages
from Fleet Numerical Weather Central. (FNWC OUTGOING)
(3) The reception, processing, write-up, and filing of messages
to the Naval Postgraduate School. (NPGS INCOMING)
(li) The reception, processing, write-up, and transmission of
outgoing massages from the Naval Postgraduate School. (NPGS OUT-
GOING)
C. MESSAGE PROCESSING TIMES
Messages in each category are assumed to be equally likely to be
processed at any time during the day. Furthermore, messages from all
categories wait in a single queue for processing.




works as a team to process the traffic. The two operators are engaged
in actual message processing, while the supervisor is responsible for
the overall operation of the telecommunications station. The combined
effect of the two operators working together on separate functions for
each message is one service time for each type of message, represented
by one service facility. The message processing times for each type
of message were approximated in whole minutes, and a uniform distribution
of message processing times was assumed. These processing times represent
realistic operator performance times over a twenty-four hour day. Low
processing times represent an operator working at a pace likely to re-
sult in mistakes, or an operator actually skipping some logging functions
due to a high traffic load. The high times indicate slow work.
The message processing times are broken down into two time frames.
These time frames cover the period prior to September, 1972, and the
time frame after message processing was streamlined due to the recommen-
dations of the I. G. Inspectors in September.
1 • Prior to the I. G. Inspection
The processing times prior to September, 1972, were a-" follows
a. FNWC INCOMING—three minutes * two minutes, uniformly
distributed. (Refer to Figure h)
This time includes the first operator at Station B checking
the message header for completeness and accuracy. Then he would log
the message number, date-time group, time of receipt, message prece-
dence, classification, to whom the message was to be sent, and signed
for the message. The punched paper tape was torn off and handed to the
second operator at Station E who logged the message number, originator,
date-time group, classification, precedence, time of delivery, and
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and signed the outgoing log. Ha than mounted the paper tape on the
"pony loop" tape reader and transmitted the message to Fleet Numerical
Weather Central. If the massage was classified secret, then the same
information as before, plus the number of in-house copies of the message
made, and the copy and tape destruction records were recorded at Station
A. There is an average of ten to fifteen secret messages par day.
b. FNWC OUTGOING- -three minutes + two minutes, uniformly
distributed.
This procedure involved exactly the same procedure as the
previous operation, except the first operation was performed at position
Dj then that operator handed the tape to tha second operator at Position
C.
c. NPGS INCOMING—three minutes + two minutes, uniformly
distributed.
This time included the time for the same procedures as
outlined for FNWC INCOMING for the first operator, who then handed the
printed copy of the message to the second operator. The second operator,
in turn, recorded on the message the time of receipt and massage number,
as well as tha internal routing. The required number of copies were
made using tha duplication equipment at Station G. Tha massages vera
stamped with tha appropriate classification! one or mora copies were
stamped with ACTION OFFICER and another stamped ORIGINAL. The message
copies were filed in the appropriate pigeonholes at Station A. The
rarely received secret messages were logged in the Secret Log at Station
A. There was also a log maintained to obtain the signature of the
message action officer or his representative, if appropriate, which




do NPGS OUTGOING—eight minutes + two minutes, uniformly
distributed.
This time included receipt of the handwritten message. The
message was typewritten at Station F, and the appropriate routing
indicators were assigned to the message. Typing a message on a teletype
produces a punched paper tape at the same time. This paper tape was run
through the tape reader at the preparation teletype, and another printed
copy was made to make a comparison with the original to check for correct-
ness. If incorrect, the tape was spot corrected. If correct, the tape
was given to the second operator at Station C. He filled in the ap-
propriate logs as in Step 2 of the FNWC OUTGOING processing function.
At the same time, the first operator would go to Station G and prepare
duplicate copies for internal processing. He would then perform the
stamping, filing, and logging functions as described for NPGS INCOMING
for internal routing.
2 • After the I. G. Inspection
These time-consuming procedures were drastically reduced as a
result of the increased message load and the I. G. inspection. The
basic change was the elimination of the logs described under FNWC
INCOMING messages. Even the Secret Log has been eliminated for FNWC
INCOMING and OUTGOING* The rationale for this is that the telecommuni-
cations center provides nothing more than a message switching function,
and is not a holder of classified data.
The incoming and outgoing logs which were maintained beginning
in September, 1972, were sheets of paper consisting of long lists of
numbers. Since each message has a number assigned to it, all that is
performed in the logging function is checking the number if the message
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is classified Confidential or higher, or circling the number if the
message is classified UNCLAS EFTO. The number of UHCLASS EFTO messages
per month must bo reported to the Commander, Naval Communications
Command. The action officer log was also eliminated. In fact, the
amount of information logged has been reduced so much that the infor-
mation contained in the monthly message summaries (Appendix A) is no
longer obtainable, with the exception of monthly totals for incoming and
outgoing messages.
The new processing times are as follows: (Refer to Fig-ore 1|.)
a. P'lWC INCOMING—mean of one minute, with negligible variance.
This time included checking the message routing indicators
and headings for accuracy. The message number was than circled or checked
(as appropriate) in the INCOMING log. These functions were performed at
Station B. The message tape was then handed to the second operator who
performed the same logging functions (check or circle); he then mounted
the tape on the tape reader at Station E, and saw that the message was
sent out properly.
b. FNVJC OUTGOING—mean of one minute, with negligible variance.
This time reduction is for the same reasons as mentioned
before. The process is just reversed. The first operator is now at
Station D, and the second operator is at Station C.
c. NPGS INCOMING—the same processing time of three minutes +
two minutes, uniformly distributed.
Even though the time involved in the logging function has
been reduced, as outlined by the previously mentioned procedures, the
majority of time is taken up by the duplication and filing functions.
The second change in the processing function for these messages was the
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elimination of the action officer log.
d. NPGS OUTGOING—the same amount of time of eight minutes
+ two minutes, uniformly distributed.
The time to process these messages was the same as before
because, except for the changes in one log, the procedures have remained
the same.
D, THE SIMULATION MODEL
Once the handling times were estimated, the simulation model was
developed. There were four types of messages arriving at the tele-
communications center. Each type was arriving at a different rate over
a certain period of time. As shown in Appendix A, the daily arrival
rates of all types of messages except FNWC INCOMING remained relatively
constant „ These periods were: prior- to August of 1971, from August, 1971,
to June, 1972, and from July, 1972, to the present. The simulation covers
the two most recent periods.
Once the arrival rates were simulated, the messages would then be
simulated to be collected in a single queue (refer to Figure £)« This
simulation technique means that, in reality, messages from all four
categories had to wait in the form of punched paper tape lying on the
floor and printed messages on rolls of paper on the teletypes, for the
two operators to get around to processing them. These two operators,
working together, provide the same function as a single facility in the
simulation. The facility takes messages one at a time, processes it,
and then handles the next message.
Now the question of message priorities arises. How are messages of
the various precedences (priorities) handled here? ROUTINE, PRIORITY,
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priority is not given to a message because of its assigned precedence.
All messages are afforded the same treatment. The first message in is
the first message out (first in—first out). Precedence becomes a factor
at the two facilities with which tho telecommunications center communicates,
At both Float Numerical Weather Central and Norton Air Force Rise, messages
of a certain precedence are given priority in tlie queue over all other
messages of a lower precedence, and behind all others of the same
precedence. For example, an OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE message being sent to
Fleet Numerical Weather Central via the Norton Automatic Switching Center
would enter the queue for transmission to Fleet Numerical Weather Central
ahead of all PRIORITY and ROUTINE messages and behind all FLASH and
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE traffic already in the queue.
E. ARRIVAL RATES
With the basic simulation developed, the four different arrival rates
were determined utilizing the data enclosed in Appendix A. This data was
broken into two periods—April-June, 1972, and July-October, 1972, re-
flecting the two most recent, fairly constant, message volume periods.
Using this data, probability mass functions over the April-June and July-
October periods were plotted for FNWC INCOMING and over the entire seven-
month period for the other three (as shown in Appendix B). Then, using
the probability mass functions, cumulative distribution functions were
derived for use in the simulation (Appendix C) for simulating message
arrival rates.
Appendix D, the basic GPSS program for the period prior to July, 1972,
has three functions at the top: FNWIN, NPGIN, and FNOUT. The functions
represent sample points taken from the cumulative distribution functions
(Appendix C) to represent input rate. For example, refer to the basic
1|2

program (Appendix D). In the first function (FNWIN), the fourth group
is /. 67, 1|. 80/. This group refers back to Appendix C. This group means
that the probability of the FNWC INCOMING messages arriving at, or less
than, the rate of 300 per day (l message every I4.8 minutes) is .67, as
shown on the graph.
The message input rate for NPGS OUTGOING is represented in the basic
program (Appendix D) by a GENERATE function (GENERATE 160,160). This
form of representation was utilized because of the almost uniform dis-




Appendices E through L show a representative sample of the simulation
results. Before examining these appendices, an analysis must be m3.de of
the results as a whole. As previously stated, a simulation is not an
exact analog, but rather a representation of the system.
A. OVERALL ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
In Appendix G, the number of entries that passed through the facility-
was 13, 139 * When this figure is compared to 11,631). messages handled in
the month of June, 1972, which this model simulated, the results show that
the message volume in the simulation is some 12 per cent higher than the
telecommunications center actually experienced.
In Appendix L, the simulation shows 23, 8l£ messages having entered
the system, which, when compared to the 27,5>1*0 messages handled by the
telecommunications center, is about four per cent high.
In retrospect, some of the disparity can be accounted for. Some of
the messages are incorrect when received and thus must be re-broadcast.
This process takes time and the replacement message is given the same
number as in the incorrect message received. As a result, there are nc
data available on the amount or even the percentage of messages that m st
be handled twice.
The simulation output contains many statistics. Those which are of
interest are
:
!• The Facility Average Utilization, or the extent to which the
message processing facilities were busy.
2. The Facility Number Entries, which represents the number of
messages handled by the telecommunications center over the period.
1*1*

3* The Facility Average Time/Iran, or the average number of minutes
that it took to process a message, regardless of the source of the message,
h' The Queue Maximum Contents and Avera ge Contents are the maximum
and average amounts of messages waiting to be processed by the operators.
By far, the most important statistic computed in this simulation
was the Facility Average Utilisation. 'When transactions arrive randomly
at a facility, and the facility takes a certain time to process these
transactions, inevitably queues or waiting lines will build up. The
Facility Average Utilization, in the case of this simulation, is defined
as the amount of time the operators spend processing messages, divided
by the total amount of time available.
The greater the utilization of the facility^jihe longer the queues
will become. If the facility utilization is .25 then the' queue lengths
will be vary small. If the facility utilization is .90 then the queues
will be large. When a single facility for which items are queuing be-
comes more than 80 per cent utilized, then the queue size increases at
an extremely fast rate. Thus a small increase in traffic may cause
severe degradation in the performance of the system.
B. COMPUTER OUTPUT STATISTICS
1. The Basic Program
Appendix E shows the results of the basic program run for one
month under the average loads that existed prior to July, 1972. The
results show that during this period the average utilization of the
facility was 95 per cent, well above the danger point previously
mentioned. The number of messages processed, from all four categories,
was 13,171 and the average time it took to process a message was a little




and, at one time during the simulated month, the amount of messages
waiting to be processed reached a maximum of 23.
2. Sensitivity Analysis
Appendices F through J show a representative sample of the
sensitivity analysis run on the basic program. Various parameters
were changed to see what effects these changes bad on the results.
Appendix F represents a three -month period (April -June). As a
result of running the simulation for this length of time, the Facility
Average Utilisation dropped slightly to .91(2 and a total of 39,ljl8
messages were processed. Hie previously mentioned figures from Appendix
E dropped slightly in proportion to the slight reduction in average
utilization.
Appendix G shows the results of reducing the processing time
by one minute for FNWC INCOMING messages (the greatest single source of
message volume). This one minute reduction in processing time produced
dramatic results in the simulation. Facility Utilization was reduced
from .95 to .718, and average time per transaction was reduced from
3.118 minutes to 2.632 minutes. The average queue length was reduced to
less than one message with a maximum contents of 7. The average time a
message spent waiting in the queue before it was processed was about two
minutes.
In Appendix H, FNWC INCOMING average processing time was increased
by one minute. The major effect of this change was to create a large
queue. Only 5°3 messages passed through the facility; yet, the queue
had already grown to 107 messages and this figure was increasing. The
Facility Average Utilization was up to .996 and the simulation terminated,
indicating the beginning of a long queue.
U6

Appendix I shows the minor changes in the results of the simulation
as a result of reducing the RPGS INCOMING mean message processing time by
one minute. These are the same results obtained by reducing the mean
processing time by one minute for FNWC OUTGOING, Both these categories
of messages have similar volumes. The major result of this time reduction
was a slight reduction in Facility Average Utilization from .95 to .908.
Then, the basic program was run for one month with all the mean
processing times reduced by one minute. Appendix J shows the results of
this major change. The Facility Average Utilization was reduced from the
excessive figure of .9$ to a more reasonable .639. The average time per
transaction was reduced to two minutes, and the average queue length
decreased to less than one, with a maximum length of six messages.
3° Massage Volume Increase
After conducting this sensitivity analysis, an understanding was
gained of the results of varying the different parameters. The simulation
was then changed In order to simulate the operation of the telecommunic blons
center after the tremendous increase in traffic volume, as a result of ae
changes in reporting procedures on July 1, 1972, for oathythermographic
and weather reports. This simulation covers the period when the old
processing times were in effect prior to the I. G. Inspection. Appendix
K shows that a large queue is formed. Of the 199 messages that entered
the simulation, 106 remained in the queue and only 93 were processed. In
other words, the telecommunications center was able to handle less than
half of their message volume using their time-consuming traditional
procedures, during the months of July and August, 1972. In reality, the
traffic got through although a lot of mistakes were made. Messages
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were not handled properly and all of the internal logging was not per-
formed.
U . Decrease in Massage Processing Times
Appendix L shows the results of the decrease in handling times
brought about by the reduction of a lot of internal paperwork induced by
informal recommendations during the I. G. Inspection in September, 1972.
Here, the Facility Average Utilization has dropped to a more reasonable
.781 and the average time per transaction is only 1.17 minutes. The
average queue contents were less than one and the average time a message
spent in the queue was IJ4I4 minutes.
1*8

V, DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
This thesis shows that the improvement of manual message handling
techniques by the adoption of better and faster methods and procedures
will significantly increase overall system performance and efficiency.
As message processing techniques are improved, the ability to handle
faster data rates will also improve.
The telecommunications center was tasked, more than once, well
beyond its normal capabilities „ Adequate planning has clearly not been
evident in the recent history of the telecommunications center. Planning
is the first function of a manager. However, proper planning must in-
volve some prediction of the future as well as a detailed knowledge of
the present and past.
A simulation, such as this one, can be used to give the manager of
a telecommunications center a detailed knowledge of the present and past
by allowing him to measure his center's capabilities. The technique of
simulation can then be utilized to test the effects of anticipated future
changes in requirements, prior to the time these changes occur. Based on
the results of the simulation, management could plan accordingly.
A. USAGE OF THE TECHNIQUE OF SIMULATION
For example, if the telecommunications center had been made aware of
the plans to increase its traffic load in July, 1972, a simulation such
as this could have been used to forestall that increase, by showing
higher authority that it was presently at its limit in volume which could
be handled using its present procedures. Then, if given a relatively
accurate estimate of the increased load expected, the center could have
used a simulation such as this to determine what changes in the time
k9

spent handling each massage would have to be made in order to handle the
new load- Once this was known, the new procedures could have been de-
veloped and adopted. This type of application of the technique of
simulation, as well as many others, can be used in the field of tele-
communications, where queuing and capacity problems arise with increasing
regularity.
B. EQUIPMENT CHANGES
This thesis also shows that the speed and effectiveness of Naval
Communications is a function not only of the time spent in the message
handling process, but also of the installed equipment's capabilities.
Due to increases in the FNWC INCOMING message load, the telecommunications
center had its limit reached, first due to its message handling times,
and most recently, due to the volume limitations of its installed equip-
ment. Both of these cases indicate inadequate support for Fleet Numerical
Weather Central's crucial communications needs.
Despite the fact that the telecommunications center handles a very
small percentage of all data used by Fleet Numerical Weather Central,
all of the data sent through the telecommunications canter is crucial.
It is crucial because first, it involves all the command and control
traffic sent to and from Fleet Numerical Heather Central. Secondly, to
support the Navy's ships, Fleet Numerical Weather Central must send and
receive its data, by means of the Defense Communications System. The
only means of getting oceanographic and meteorological data in support
of ships at sea, is to get data in the area where those same ships are
operating.
To illustrate how important Fleet Numerical Weather Central considers
this data, one must realize that each bathythermograph message is hand-
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checked for obvious inaccuracies at Fleet Numerical Heather Central,
prior to inputing the data into the computer for use in forecasting.
These mistakes can be the result of errors made by the originator, or
caii be the result of the inherent errors in the Navy's Communications
System (high-frequency as the transmission medium, punched paper tape,
man-machine interface, etc.)* Whatever the reason, Fleet Numerical
Weather Central has experienced a one -third increase in the amount of
errors in the bathythermographic messages received since it started
having them transmitted via the Defense Communications System, as compared
with the amount of errors it found whan these same massages were trans-
mitted via the Naval Environmental Data Network.
The telecommunications center was belatedly successful in correcting
its handling time problems. Due to the I. G« Inspection it corrected
themj however, two months is rather long for the situation to have lasted
before positive steps were undertaken to reduce the message processing
times.
As far as correcting the machine limitation problem, as of 16 January
1973.> the machine capabilities of the telecommunications canter were
essentially doubled (refer to Figure 6). A full duplex link with Norton
Air Force Base was installed, as well as a new simplex "pony loop" for
message transmission from the telecommunications center to Fleet
Numerical Weather Central.
For example, FNWC INCOMING comas in at Stations B and E and is log-
ged twice (once for incoming, once for outgoing) and then is sent out to
Fleet Numerical Weather Central at the adjoining stations (A or F as
appropriate). FNWC OUTGOING is still sent into the telecommunications

































































































Station D is also an outgoing circuit but is usually used for NPGS
OUTGOING. NPGS INCOMING is received on either of the two incoming
circuits (B or E)„
Despite the fact that the machine capabilities of this center have
been doubled, the simulation, as outlined for the period after the I. G.
Inspection, still holds true. There are still only two operators directly
involved in message processing, and the time to process each type of
message remains the same. The telecommunications center is again I/O
bound by its procedures, not its equipement. Now that the Autoraatic
Switching Center at Norton can pass its FNWC INCOMING traffic to the
telecommunications center twice as fast, it is no longer bothered by
the excessive queue lengths experienced in the past, which caused the
alt-routing of messages to Fort. Ord. Norton's problems have diminished.
It might seem that the telecommunications center's problems have
diminished also, since it now has two circuits over which to pass traffic
to fleet Numerical Weather Central. At the current traffic levels this
is the case. However, should the traffic load be drastically increasec
again, as it has been in the past, the message processing Facility
Utilization level will rise above the .78 region where it is presently - it-
erating into the so-called danger region above .80, where queues grow





A variant of Parkinson's law as it relates to Naval Communications
states that, "message volume increases over a circuit over time to fill
the available capacity. " In other words, if the machines can handle
1600 average-sised incoming messages per day, some day in the not too
distant future, they will be handling that volume.
Can the message processing function of this telecommunications center,
as it is presently configured, handle such a load? Probably not. The
message handling procedures in effect today are streamlined as far as
possible o The only recourse is to add more men to process the traffic.
Since the telecommunications center is not included in the Naval
Communications Automation Program, it cannot be funded for automated
equipment. As it is presently configured, there is room for four opera-
tors per watch section to be involved in the message handling process,
without getting in each other's way. The use o.f four men would, in effect,
halve the service times (processing times) for each category of messages,
since they would be processing messages in parallel. If the operator
manning level were doubled, then the telecommunications center could
handle the maxLmum machine through-put. There are some other recommendations
to be made as a result of this study, all of which fall in the general
category of machine capabilities.
B. MACHINE CAPABILITIES
1. Fleet Numerical Weather Central
The first recommendation has already been made by the Commanding
Officer of the Naval Communications Station, San Francisco, involving
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upgrading Fleet Numerical Weather Central's communications capabilities.
There is no question about the fact that an AUTODIN Mode I terminal is
needed to handle the traffic that presently passes through the tele-
communications center. This capability should be placed adjacent to
Fleet Numerical Weather Central's computers.
Prior to a single -purpose installation of such sophisticated
equipment, a study should be made of the communications requirements
and capabilities of all military installations in the Monterey Bay area.
Fort Ord, for example, has just recently replaced its 600 BAUD Mode I
AUTODIN terminal with new equipment because of a need for the equipment
to have a magnetic tape capability. The old Mode I at Fort Ord was
operating at 3-5 po^ cent of its maximum capability,, The new equipment
is an IBM 360/20 processor controlled 1200 BAUD Mode I AUTODIN terminal
which, by deduction, should be operating at an extremely small percentage
of its maximum capacity. Are two such high-speed communications devices
justified for the Monterey Bay area? This question must be examined with
the thought of consolidation in mind, prior to the installation of the
new Mode I at Fleet Numerical Weather Central's planned new computer
center.
2. Communications with Fort Ord
The next recommendation concerns the contingency alt-route plan
in use by the telecommunications center. The present system of having
a truck link between the two telecommunications facilities is completely
unsatisfactory. A cost and potential utilization study should be ini-
tiated concerning the replacement of this system with a full duplex 100
word per minute teletype link. Should the communications links between
the Naval Telecommunications Center and Norton by broken for a long
55

period of time, the expense of installing the circuit and compatible
crypto equipment at the two telecommunications centers could be justified
by Fleet Numerical Weather Central as an operational necessity, because
it would allow a virtually uninterrupted flow of its vital traffic.
3- Crypto-Protection
Since the Naval Environmental Data Network is not crypto-protected,
no classified traffic may bo transmitted on it. As a result, the Naval
Communications System must handle large amounts of data which, if the
Naval Environmental Data Network were covered, would be sent via that
network. This thesis recommends the initiation of a study to determine
the feasibility of providing the Naval Environmental Data Network with
the proper equipment so that it can carry classified traffic. This





INCOMING - APRIL 19?
2
DAY FNWX NPGS TOTAL
1 269 10* 313
2 260 23 283
3 280 29 309
h 30J4 S9 363
5 306 k6 352
6 300 57 357
7 302 63 365
8 273 k2 315
9 271 17 288
10 306 33 339
11 322 62 381*
12 325 $9 381*
13 282 71 353
Ik 277 57 33)4
16 265 1*2 307
16 238 28 266
17 286 35 321
18 29li 61 383
19 309 58 317
20 266 S$ 271
21 329 51i 3U0
22 263 Sk 383
23 255 16 360
2k 305 3S 31*0
25 325 58 383
26 305 SS 360
27 338 66 kok
28 317 $6 373
29 •297 51 3U8






OUTGOING - APRIL 1972
DAT FNWC" NPGS TOTAL
1 8U 6 90
2 81 81
3 83 7 90
1* 73 1* 77
5 9x 11* 68
6 1*9 13 62
7 1*8 11 59
8 69 5 Ik
9 81 1 82
10 73 5 78
13. 68 18 86
12 k9 8 57
13 ko 16 56
m 66 11 77
15 U9 7 56
16 58 6 6k
17 68 1* 72
18 61* 12 76
19 58 16 7)4
20 i(6 11 57
21 % 9 61*
22 67 9 76
23 61 2 63
2k 63 6 69
25 68 15 83
26 $h 9 63
27 51 1* $5
28 1*8 8 56
29 58 3 61






INCOMING ~ MY 1972
DAT FNWC NPGS TOTAL
1 285 51 336
2 303 50 353
3 327 SS 382
h 298 he 3^4
5 310 71 381
6 23U k9 283
7 277 33 310
8 303 53 3%
9 313 71 38U
10 330 58 388
11 28JU 76 360
12 295 67 362
13 267 111 308
lU 287 50 337
15 290 36 326
16 307 39 3h6
17 329 68 397
18 332 76 1|03
19 33J* 53 367
20 301 37 338
21 266 33 299
22 2li7 36 283
23 327 58 385
2k 278 51 329
25 268 65 333
26 282 35 327
27 273 hi 320
28 21+7 19 366
29 229 11 2U0
30 233 31 26k






OUTGOING - MAY 1972
DAY FNWC NPGS TOTAL
1 6h 7 71
2 63 20 83
3 h9 10 ^9
h la 18 $9
5 h9 13 62
6 56 1 57
7 68 68
8 56 h 60
9 61 10 71
10 U2 15 57
11 35 7 1|2
12 25 111 39
13 Uo 5 U5
Ik ia 2 Ii3
15 Ui 13 51*
16 hi 9 56
17 1±2 7 1*9
18 33 6 39
19 31 10 111
20 U9 2 51
21 39 3 U2
22 Ui 8 52
23 1|D 6 hS
2U 38 11 h,9
25 32 10 U2
26 29 5 3U
27 1*2 1 Ii3
28 la 1 U2
29 la 2 Ii3
30 52 11 63






INCOMING - JUNE 1972
DAY FNWC NPGS TOTAL
1 282 51* 336
2 302 68 370
3 265 1*3 308
1* 261 36 297
5 285 53 338
6 272 56 328
7 299 60 359
8 3QU 51 355
9 2l|8 U7 295
10 250 1*0 290
11 301 19 320
12 331 U9 380
13 309 1*3 352
Hi 308 1*3 351
15 336 hh 380
16 306 72 378
17 298 30 328
18 300 18 318
19 2I48 39 287
20 M 75 1*23
21 3h7 66 1*13
22 365 1*9 1*11*
23 326 ^ 381
2U 300 3U 331*
25 323 25 31*8
26 326 6k 390
27 361 63 L.2li
28 389 68 1*57









OUTGOING - JUNE 1972
DAY FNWC NPGS TOTAL
1 33 13 U6
2 )& 20 65
3 hs 10 56
1* 55 3 58
5 3S 16 51
6 k9 13 62
7 32 13 \6
8 3U lit 1*8
9 28 18 he
10 ko It 1*1*
11 2*2 2 hh
12 1*1* 5 k9
13 U6 25 71
]il 36 22 58
15 3U 13 ii7
16 28 lit 1*2
17 U6 8 $k
18 1*0 1*0
19 1+7 12 59
20 1*7 12 59
21 31 12 1*3
22 3U 12 U6
23 38 16 51*
2k 1*7 1*7
25 39 3 1*2
26 50 9 ^9
27 1*9 17 66
28 53 19 72
29 • 33 13 1)6






INCOMING - JULY 1972
DAY FNWC NPGS TOTAL
1 506 91 597
2 ii.88 38 526
3 512 U2 551;
k 515 1*2 557
5 530 ks 576
6 615 77 692
7 683 83 766
8 661 75 736
9 707 U6 753
10 7)45 50 795
11 805 107 912
12 82*8 6k 912
13 796 123 919
Hi 738 66 90h
15 61*1 65 706
16 666 38 701* •
17 690 kl 737
18 7)43 6k 807
19 783 95 878
20 776 kk 820
21 726 62 788
22 656 53 709
23 659 20 679
2k 135 26 761
25 135 1*0 775
26 711 87 798
27 689 1*3 732
28 • 681 63 71*1*
29 589 5k 6k3
30 600 32 632






OUTGOING - JULY 1972
DAT FIWC NPGS TOTAL
1 88 5 93
2 82* 8U
3 90 3 93
k 87 7 9k
5 77 13 90
6 Ik 20 9k
7 81 23 lOl;
8 9k 12 106
9 100 7 10?
10 73 21 9k
11 77 31 108
12 82 18 100
13 8U 30 111*
Ik 88 13 101
15 9$ 10 105
16 9k 7 101
17 78 10 88
18 Ik 18 92
19 91 18 109
20 9k 20 111;
21 92 10 102
22 92 8 100
23 83 1 8U
2k 88 10 98
25 85 28 113
26 67 Ui 108
27 66 22 87
28 66 9 7JU
29 70 25 96
30 73 9 82






INCOMING - AUGUST 1972
DAT FNWC NPGS TOTAL
1 613 hZ 61i5
2 690 1£ 735
3 711 Ui 752
k 683 1*7 730
5 6hh 35 679
6 618 26 6kh
7 607 28 635
8 69k 2*2 736
9 715 39 7$h
10 717 39 756
11 673 39 812
12 561; 26 590
13 567 20 587
Hi 563 29 592
15 628 25 653
16 663. 39 702
17 6$0 kk 69h
18 572 72 6kh
19 535 k3 678
20 567 32 699
21 $16 5o 595
22 691 53 7^
23 69$ 7U 669
2it 667 60 727
25 602 6k 666
26 600 $9 659
27 603 38 6J-1
28 608 60 663
29 669 62 731
30 631 71 702






OUTGOING - AUGUST 1972
DAY FNWC KPGS TOTAL
1 80 16 96
2 58 k 62
3 72 13 85
k 68 lk 82
5 83 8 91
6 89 5 9k
7 90 17 99
8 88 m 93
9 Ik 15 91
10 70 9 81*
11 82 1 97
12 83 10 92
13 86 15 87
lU 86 lit 96
15 lk 18 89
16 69 ill 83
17 67 u 85
18 68 3 82
19 80 9 8k
20 90 5 93
21 85 8 93
22 89 11 100
23 67 lk 81
21* 77 10 87
25 83 8 91
26 8U 2 86
27 82 5 87
28 90 21 111
29 79 8 87
30 85 8 93






INCOMING - SEPTEMBER 1972
DAI FNWC NPGS' TOTAL
1 660 72 732
2 679 kk 723
3 662 ko 702
k 571 67 638
5 tth 50 60lt
6 6hh 70 71U
7 668 65 733
8 69li 81 775
9 591 71 662
10 590 51 61.1
11 601 $6 657
12 719 70 789
13 7ii3 71 811.
Ik 736 83 819
15 763 101 861;
16 592 61 653
17 577 29 606
18 597 50 6kl
19 621; BU 708
20 619 89 708
21 6h3 85 728
22 631 85 716
23 61|6 57 703
2k 582 39 621
25 590 63 6$3
26 667 91 758
27 719 83 802
28 722 86 808
29 666 78 Ihh






OUTGOING - SEPTEMBER 1972
DAI FHWC NPGS TOTAL
1 79 10 89
2 80 3 83
3 9k 3 97
it 88 7 9^
5 89 5 9k
6 73 27 100
7 67 17 81i
8 93 21 llli
9 9k 5 99
10 89 6 9$
11 93 10 103
12 83 13 96
13 78 11 89
1U 82 11 93
15 80. 111 9k
16 86 15 101
17 87 k 91
18 87 1U 101
19 87 16 103
20 79 19 98
21 100 17 117
22 70 6 76
23 62 k 66
2k 86 2 88
25 92 19 111
26 103 9 112
27 89 10 99
28 78 8 86
29 86 7 93






INCOMING - OCTOBER 1972
DAY FNWC NPGS TOTAL
1 690 66 756
2 678 71* 752
3 711 81 792
1* 707 72 779
5 759 107 866
6 731 81* 815
7 682 76 758
8 628 1*1* 672
9 587 1*2 629
10 572 60 632
11 680 77 757
12 702 80 782
13 708 92 791*
Hi 62*3 81* 735
15 589 85 673
16 689 113 771*
17 727 131 81*0
18 775 118 906
19 8U0 108 958
20 736 86 81*1*
21 686 83 769
22 675 72 71*7
23 731 73 801*
2k 702 96 793
25 788 158 91*6
26 783 15U 937
27 . 797 161 958
28 661 96 757
29 625 111* 739
30 581 110 691






OUTGOING - OCTOBER 1972
DAY FNWC NPGS TOTAL
1 102 2 101;
2 93 6 99
3 109 5 nil
k 88 It 92
5 9h 11 105
6 87 5 92
7 95 8 103
8 77 3 80
9 88 7 9$
10 95 3 98
11 77 5 82
12 95 2 97
13 79 6 85
lit 96 1 97
15 96 u 100
16 109 It 113
17 98 2 100
18 85 2 87
19 92 10 102
20 97 6 103
21 lQU 2 106
22 96 1 97
23 93 93
2k 111 3 im
2$ 85 it 89
26 86 86
27 93 8 101
28 • 91 2 93
29 95 5 100
30 82 l 83



















































































































































































































































































































































































THE BASIC GPSS PROGRAM FOR ONE MONTH
FNWIN FUNCTION RN1,C8
0,0/. 05,6.00/. 17,5-538/ o5,5.Hi3/. 67, It. 80/. 87,1;. 5/. 93,
U. 235/1. 0,1;.
NPGIN FUNCTION RN1,C11
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A management analysis of the Naval Telecommunications, Center,
Monterey, was conducted to analyse the requirements placed on this
center, as well as to determine how capable it was to perform these
requirements. A computer simulation model was developed and used to
quantify the message processing capabilities of the center under various
historical conditions. Results showed that the various requirements
placed on this center have been constantly increasing, without regard
to the center's ability to handle them. The results also showed that
at times the center's capabilities were limited by its machine capabilities,
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